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RACE AND GENDER IN THE LAW REVIEW 
Cynthia Grant Bowman,* Dorothy Roberts** & Leonard S. Rubinowitz*** 
A number of years ago a noted historian of the American West, 
Patricia Limerick, addressed the plenary session of the Association of 
American Law Schools.1  In her speech, she described how the received his-
tory of the West consisted of a narrative in which explorers like Lewis and 
Clark entered and discovered a vast empty territory.  This account was, of 
course, inaccurate; as Limerick pointed out, the West was populated before 
the explorers arrived, just not with folks like them.  And, she noted, how 
much more interesting the story has become since we can now see that 
empty land as populated with diverse peoples.   
As important, the traditional narrative obscured the bloody reality of 
extermination, enslavement, and domination by white settlers that placed 
them in a position to construct an official history.2  It deleted as well the re-
sistance of the peoples the settlers tried to subjugate.  The story has become 
both less noble and more complicated once contested by the perspectives of 
people of color.   
Law review literature followed a similar pattern.  When you glance 
back one hundred years, as we have done in preparing for this symposium, 
the contents of Northwestern’s law review reflect a territory inhabited only 
by white males and their legal problems.  Gradually, however, the other 
populations that have been there all along appear in its pages—African 
Americans first, then women, then people of color in whom a variety of 
characteristics intersect, and finally persons of differing sexual orientations.  
Their appearance initially was provoked by changes in the legal environ-
ment, such as the decision in Brown v. Board of Education and the passage 
 
*  Professor of Law and of Gender Studies, Northwestern University School of Law.  Professor Bow-
man would like to thank Judge Elaine Bucklo and Professor Herma Hill Kay for their information about 
the “old days,” and Rachel Julis and Laura Straus for their assistance with research. 
**  Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Faculty Fellow, In-
stitute for Policy Research.  Thanks to Haile Arrindell and Laura Straus for excellent research assistance 
and to the Kirkland & Ellis Research Fund for support. 
***  Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.  Thanks to Brett Miller for excellent 
research assistance.  
1  Patricia Nelson Limerick, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting 
(Jan. 8, 1993).   
2  See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism:  The Contemporary Legacy of European 
Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 
(1989). 
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of the Civil Rights Acts; but once they had been acknowledged as appropri-
ate subjects for legal research, a flowering of theory and analysis ensued. 
This Essay tells the story of the discovery of race and gender in the 
pages of the Northwestern University Law Review (“the Law Review”).  It is 
not a story of theory leading practice.  Indeed, the work of activists pursu-
ing social change was the initial impulse for the development of theoretical 
work on these issues.  Now, however, both race and gender are recognized 
as important themes in the law.  The addition of these topics has profoundly 
affected and improved legal theory, which is today far more complex and 
nuanced than the men who originally established the Law Review would 
have dreamed. 
Because of the critical, and continuing, link between real-world activ-
ism on issues of race and gender and academic writing about those issues, 
our discussion will be set in the historical context that led to the develop-
ment of theory and, in turn, was influenced by it.  We begin by discussing, 
in Part I, the injection of issues of race into the Law Review, against the 
background of the struggle for civil rights in the United States.  Part II then 
traces the introduction of discussions of gender and sexual orientation.  Part 
III describes the development of critical race theory and critical race femi-
nism, highlighting their virtual absence from these pages.  Critical race 
theorists contested liberal notions of racial progress that dominated civil 
rights discourse as well as mainstream feminists’ failure to see the intersec-
tion of racism and sexism in structures of power.  Although the Law Review 
discovered the existence of diverse peoples and included articles about 
them, it has for the most part failed to include their uniquely critical per-
spective, reflected in critical race theory.  This scholarly lacuna highlights 
the importance of going beyond the analysis of discrimination using tradi-
tional legal tools to challenge the central role legal reasoning and institu-
tions have played in perpetuating inequality. 
I. RACE 
A. The First Half-Century 
When the first volume (1906–1907) of what was then called the Illinois 
Law Review included an article on slavery, that did not signal the beginning 
of a trend.3  In the next half-century, the Law Review paid little attention to 
racial questions.  When it did so, the arguments and analyses often reflected 
 
3  The article discussed Abraham Lincoln’s representation of a Kentucky slave owner who had 
brought a slave family to Illinois, a free state, in 1845 and then sought to take the family back to Ken-
tucky as slaves, in 1847.  The author sought to defend Lincoln’s defense of the slave owner by suggest-
ing that Lincoln argued for his client only on procedural grounds, and, when asked by the judge for his 
substantive view, Lincoln replied that the family should be declared to be free because their owner had 
brought them to Illinois.  Duncan T. McIntyre, Lincoln and the Matson Slave Case, 1 ILL. L. REV. 386 
(1907).   
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the law and ideology of the time, and therefore were as likely to seem egre-
giously racist to modern sensibilities as to reflect more enlightened views 
on race. 
When the Illinois Law Review began publishing a decade after Plessy 
v. Ferguson,4 it joined the national chorus of silence about that decision.5  
While the journal’s lack of attention to Plessy may have stemmed in part 
from its early emphasis on Illinois state law issues, the gap also reflected 
the fact that the case received little public or scholarly attention for many 
years after the Supreme Court spoke.  The decision that came to be seen as 
a key symbol of our national shame of racial subordination passed largely 
unnoticed at the time—a sign of the deeply embedded nature of the racism 
it reflected. 
In fact, the main mention of Plessy in the early decades of the Illinois 
Law Review came in a 1926 article by Northwestern Professor Andrew A. 
Bruce, discussing racial zoning by private contract.6  Bruce cited Plessy as 
part of the legal context of segregation within which he considered re-
straints on alienation and restraints on use.  He argued against restraints on 
alienation and in favor of the permissibility of restraints on use—including 
the exclusion of Blacks from living in white neighborhoods—using Plessy 
to provide support for his argument.7 
Consistent with much of the thought and rhetoric of the time, the au-
thor suggested that the consequence of Blacks moving into white neighbor-
hoods was  
usually, and almost inevitably, not merely a lessening of property values but a 
constant irritation and ultimate moving out of the original inhabitants who are 
unwilling to have colored neighbors and above all to send their children to the 
neighborhood district public schools where the children of all classes and na-
tionalities mingle and congregate.8   
 
4  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
5  There was little comment about Plessy by scholars and others until the 1940s.  Cheryl I. Harris, 
The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson:  The Death and Resurrection of Racial Formalism, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 181, 216 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). 
6  Andrew A. Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitutions and the 
Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, 21 ILL. L. REV. 704 (1927). 
7  Id. at 711.  “Black” is capitalized whenever it refers to Black people, in order to indicate that 
Blacks, or African Americans, are a specific cultural group with its own history, traditions, experience, 
and identity—not just people of a particular color.  Using the uppercase letter signifies recognition of the 
culture, as it does with Latinos, Asian Americans, or Native Americans.  See MARTHA BIONDI, TO 
STAND AND FIGHT:  THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003); Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:  Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).  
8  Bruce, supra note 6, at 704. 
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He argued that private agreements to restrict use on a racial basis would aid 
free alienation because “the fear of a negro invasion materially interferes 
with the profitable sale of almost every homesite.”9 
Even earlier, in its Editorial Notes, the Law Review reported favorably 
on the resolution of a question of racial exclusion that was before the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) in 1912.10  The Executive Committee 
had elected three Black members without knowledge of their race.  When 
their race became apparent, southern members protested and the Executive 
Committee sought to revoke the Blacks’ membership.  The Law Review 
commented favorably on the ABA’s racially tainted resolution of this con-
troversy:  
That as it has never been contemplated that members of the colored race 
should become members of this Association, the several local councils are di-
rected, if at any time any of them shall recommend a person of the colored race 
for membership, to accompany the recommendation with a statement of the 
fact that he is of such race.11   
The Law Review concluded that it was quite proper that racial information 
be provided so that future elections could proceed with full knowledge of 
the relevant facts.12  The editorial also applauded the “fine spirit” of the 
Black member who resigned because he had been elected without the mem-
bers having knowledge of all the relevant facts.13  In taking this position, the 
Law Review reflected the racial norms of the times and aligned itself with 
the dominant view within the legal establishment.14   
While racial discrimination was at times condoned in the pages of the 
Law Review, on other occasions race remained invisible in discussions of 
topics where a substantial discussion of race might have been expected.  A 
1918 article, Justice Holmes and the Fourteenth Amendment, paid only 
brief attention to racial discrimination and did not mention Plessy.15  Almost 
two decades later, in a tribute to Justice Roger Brooke Taney, Dean 
Acheson did not discuss Dred Scott, the Justice’s best known and most no-
torious opinion.16  Instead, Acheson referred to that decision only by impli-
cation, in the first paragraph of the article, as an unfortunate departure from 
 
9  Id. at 716.  Bruce analogized restrictions on Black entry to the prohibition of the sale or use of liq-
uor in an area, since both have “a marked and beneficial tendency to attract purchasers to a residential 
district.”  Id. 
10  The American Bar Association Meeting, 7 ILL. L. REV. 177, 179 (1912). 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id.  
14  It was not until 1943 that the ABA resolved that “membership in the American Bar Association is 
not dependent upon race, creed, or color.”  68 A.B.A. REP. 109–10, 168 (1943). 
15  Fletcher Dobyns, Justice Holmes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 ILL. L. REV. 71 (1918). 
16  Dean G. Acheson, Roger Brooke Taney:  Notes upon Judicial Self Restraint, 31 ILL. L. REV. 705 
(1937).   
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his otherwise exemplary record of judicial self-restraint—the focus of the 
article.17  Even an article on President Truman’s civil rights program said 
little about race.18   
In contrast, several student comments in the Law Review’s first half-
century reflected a more enlightened view on racial matters.  As early as 
1913–1914, a commentator criticized an Illinois Supreme Court decision 
permitting a cemetery to discriminate based on race.19  Similarly, a student 
case note a decade later criticized a California court’s decision holding 
valid a racially restrictive covenant.20  The note argued that the covenant 
was an impermissible restraint on alienation.  Moreover, in the 1930s, two 
students criticized the United States Supreme Court for leaving claims of 
racial discrimination in jury selection to the state courts of the South to re-
solve.21   
For much of its first half-century, the Northwestern University Law 
Review had “Illinois” in its title and focused substantially on legal devel-
opments in the state.  Yet it paid relatively little attention to the racial ques-
tions that emerged in the state, such as pervasive housing discrimination.  
Challenges to various aspects of racial exclusion from neighborhoods and 
communities resulted in significant decisions in state and federal courts, in-
cluding the United States Supreme Court’s restrictive covenant case, Hans-
berry v. Lee.22  Like most law schools’ scholarly journals of the time, 
Northwestern’s law review did not publish any articles about these devel-
opments.   
The Law Review’s first half-century of publication also failed to ad-
dress important racial questions that arose in the federal courts, the Con-
 
17  By way of an apparent apology for Taney, Acheson suggested that 
[i]t is the irony of fate that for three-quarters of a century the accepted conception of Roger Brooke 
Taney has been based upon the occasion when, yielding to the temptation, always disastrous, to 
save the country, he put aside the judicial self-restraint which was his great contribution to the law 
and custom of the Constitution. 
Id. at 705. 
18  Charles Wallace Collins, Constitutional Aspects of the Truman Civil Rights Program, 44 ILL. L. 
REV. 1 (1949).  It focused instead on arguing that Truman’s proposals to have the federal government 
protect individuals’ rights—whatever those rights might be and whoever might be protected—
constituted an unconstitutional intrusion into states’ rights. 
19  Alfred W. Bays, Cemeteries—Discrimination Against Negroes, 8 ILL. L. REV. 208 (1913).  The 
comment included a reasoned argument challenging the Court’s analysis, as well as an eloquent state-
ment about the injustice of this form of discrimination. 
20  Recent Case, Conveyances—Restraints Against Alienation to Negroes, 20 ILL. L. REV. 723 
(1925). 
21  Alfred J. Cilella & Irwin J. Kaplan, Comment, Discrimination Against Negroes in Jury Service, 
29 ILL. L. REV. 498 (1934).  The authors characterized the Supreme Court as having “washed its hands 
of the whole question and transferred its duty of enforcement to the state authorities, who in the light of 
racial antagonism in the South cannot be expected to be overzealous in the enforcement of the negroes’ 
right to serve on juries.”  Id. at 504.  They recognized that, “[i]n all fairness, it should be pointed out that 
negro discrimination is not peculiarly a southern problem.”  Id. at 499 n.3. 
22  311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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gress, and the executive branch.  For several decades, the NAACP and sub-
sequently the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”) engaged in a litigation 
campaign focused on school segregation that resulted in a number of sig-
nificant decisions by the Supreme Court.23  A series of successful challenges 
to racial exclusion by state law schools and segregation within a state 
graduate school24 laid the groundwork for civil rights lawyers to embark on 
a frontal assault on state-imposed segregation in public schools.25  In the 
same period, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases involving exclu-
sion of Blacks from the electoral process—the so-called Texas white pri-
mary cases;26 a case holding unconstitutional the judicial enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants;27 and challenges to racial discrimination in the 
criminal justice system.28  
The World War II Japanese internment cases represent still another 
important missed opportunity.29  In particular, Korematsu v. United States, 
which both established the “strict scrutiny” test in racial discrimination 
cases and found that the federal government passed this test in interning 
120,000 Japanese Americans, received no attention in the Law Review at 
the time.   
In addition to largely ignoring significant judicial activity, the Law Re-
view during its first half-century paid little attention to the role of Congress 
and the executive branch in struggles for racial equality.  While Congress 
did not enact any civil rights legislation between 1875 and 1957, civil rights 
activists—especially the NAACP—pressed that body to address racial dis-
crimination.30  Much of the lobbying was part of a long, unsuccessful effort 
to secure federal antilynching legislation, in order to combat the lynchings 
 
23  The first case was filed in state court in Maryland on behalf of a Black applicant who was denied 
admission to the University of Maryland Law School because of his race.  The Maryland Supreme Court 
ordered his admission to the law school.  Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936); see also 
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:  THURGOOD MARHSALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 
1936–1961, at 11, 14–15 (1994).  See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). 
24  See McLauren v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 
(1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
(1938). 
25  In a post-Brown article in the Law Review, Loyola of New Orleans Law School Dean A.E. Papale 
referred to this process as the “chipping away” at Plessy.  A.E. Papale, Judicial Enforcement of Deseg-
regation:  Its Problems and Limitations, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 301, 306–08 (1957). 
26  See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. 
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).  In 1959, a student piece in the 
Law Review discussed these cases as part of a student civil rights symposium.  Elections and Voting 
Rights, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 367 (1959). 
27  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
28  Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 209 U.S. 86 (1923). 
29  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 
(1943). 
30  DENTON L. WATSON, LION IN THE LOBBY:  CLARENCE MITCHELL, JR.’S STRUGGLE FOR THE 
PASSAGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS (2002). 
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of thousands of Blacks in the South in the first half of the century—with 
virtually no prosecution of the perpetrators in state courts.31   
While the executive branch took initiatives to address racial discrimi-
nation only sporadically, these efforts also merited comment and analysis 
by law reviews.  Threatened with a massive march on Washington during 
World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order 
banning racial discrimination by federal defense contractors—thus increas-
ing opportunities for employment of Blacks in those industries.32  Later, 
President Truman ordered the racial integration of the armed forces, another 
significant step on the racial front.33  None of this activity was discussed in 
the Law Review. 
Moreover, if Blacks were barely present in the Law Review’s landscape 
during its first fifty years, other people of color—Asian Americans, Latinos, 
and Native Americans—were absent entirely.  Of course, the Law Review 
had a great deal of company in this regard, in both the scholarly world and 
the dominant culture. 
The first issue of Volume 51 of the Law Review (March–April, 1956) 
began with a congratulatory statement on the Review’s 50th anniversary by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren.34  The Chief Justice took note of the importance 
of law reviews to the judiciary in influencing judicial thought.  He praised 
the Northwestern University Law Review for its “spirit of critical examina-
tion and inquiry, of careful scholarship and devotion to the law . . . .”35  If 
the Chief Justice had wanted to identify specific topics that the Review had 
examined carefully over the previous half-century, the burning issues of 
race would not have merited a place on that list. 
B. The Second Half-Century 
The Law Review’s 50th anniversary issue also featured comments by 
Kenneth F. Burgess, President of Northwestern’s Board of Trustees, on the 
role of the law review.36  He suggested “that the law review renders its 
greatest contribution when its editors select for discussion those legal issues 
which have the greatest general interest . . . .”37  His first example of a sub-
ject with “national interest” was the segregation cases.38  Whether his ad-
 
31  The United States Senate recently issued an apology for failing to pass antilynching legislation.  
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Senate Apologizes, Mostly, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 4, at 43. 
32  Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941).  Roosevelt also established a Fair Em-
ployment Practices Committee (“FEPC”) to monitor implementation of the executive order. 
33  Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). 
34  Earl Warren, Preface, The Northwestern University Law Review Begins Its Fifty-First Year of 
Publication, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1956). 
35  Id. 
36  Kenneth F. Burgess, Law Reviews and the Practicing Lawyer, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 10 (1956). 
37  Id. at 11. 
38  Id. 
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monition is to be taken as prescription or prophecy, shortly after the cele-
bration of its first half-century of publication, discussions of race began to 
appear on the pages of the Law Review in a much more significant way.   
The Northwestern University Law Review began its second half-
century at a time of great civil rights ferment, in the courts, in the streets, 
and to a lesser extent, in Congress.  Not surprisingly, in light of the promi-
nence of Brown v. Board of Education, educational inequality received the 
most attention in the Law Review; but other race matters were also exam-
ined in scholars’ articles and student comments—including race conscious-
ness, housing, economic opportunity, and public accommodations. 
In 1959, early in the Law Review’s second half-century, the student 
editors organized a symposium on civil rights law that seemed to suggest 
that they understood the interrelated nature of the aspects of the system of 
racial subordination.  The symposium consisted of student comments on a 
broad range of civil rights issues, including federal civil rights legislation,39 
school desegregation,40 voting rights,41 federally guaranteed civil rights 
(public facilities, housing, and transportation),42 and freedom of association 
for civil rights organizations.43  In the introduction to the symposium, the 
editors acknowledged the courts’ critical and difficult role in addressing the 
problem of “racial supremacy,” as well as the initial stirrings in Congress to 
address civil rights issues for the first time in three-quarters of a century.  
The symposium set the stage for the significantly increased attention the 
Law Review would pay to racial questions over the following decades.44   
 
39  Federal Civil Rights Legislation, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 332 (1959). 
40  Racial Desegregation of Public Schools:  Application of the Principles of Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
54 NW. U. L. REV. 348 (1959); State Efforts to Circumvent Desegregation:  Private Schools, Pupil 
Placement, and Geographic Segregation, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 354 (1959).     
41  Elections and Voting Rights, supra note 26. 
42  Publicly-Owned Facilities, Housing, and Transportation:  Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights, 54 
NW. U. L. REV. 377 (1959). 
43  Group Action:  Civil Rights and Freedom of Association, 54 NW. U. L. REV. 390 (1959). 
44  Within a few years of the symposium, Northwestern University School of Law offered its first 
civil rights course taught by Professor Dawn Clark Netsch, who started the race relations course shortly 
after joining her alma mater’s faculty in 1965.  The class focused on the Supreme Court’s historical role, 
including the infamous Dred Scott decision, Brown and the developing Fourteenth Amendment case 
law, and then-current local civil rights issues, such as the exploitation of Black home buyers in Chicago 
that led to the Contract Buyers League litigation.  Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 
210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).   
The first civil rights course in the country is said to have been taught by James Nabrit, Jr. at Howard 
University.  Nabrit had been the only African American in the Northwestern University Law School 
Class of 1927, an Honor Student and the first Black at the school to be elected to the Order of the Coif.  
J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION:  THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844–1944, at 349 (1993).  
Nabrit went on to become dean of Howard Law School, President of Howard University, and a key par-
ticipant in the civil rights litigation of the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.  Telephone In-
terview by Professor Leonard Rubinowitz with Seth Kronemer, Archivist, Howard Law School (Jan. 11, 
2005).  However, it was decades before Civil Rights became a staple of the law schools’ curriculum.    
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1. Education.—Brown triggered as many questions as it answered.  
Those questions occupied the pages of the Law Review in a sustained way 
over the half-century following the decision.45  The Law Review’s scholar-
ship about race and education exhibited several patterns:  (1) it addressed a 
wide variety of the critical theoretical and practical questions that arose in 
the fifty years after Brown; (2) it made extensive use of empirical data—
both quantitative and qualitative—to test the propositions advanced; and (3) 
it often challenged the conventional wisdom of the time.  The Law Review 
thus made a substantial contribution to our knowledge about legal remedies 
for racial inequality in education. 
The post-Brown issues included, inter alia, remedy, implementation, 
violations in the North, and equalization across school districts.  Each re-
ceived attention in the Law Review.  In Brown II, the Supreme Court issued 
a vague desegregation mandate and assigned the responsibility to district 
courts to determine what constituted an acceptable desegregation plan.46  
The Court largely left matters in the hands of the district judges until the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, when it began to spell out the reach and limita-
tions of district courts’ remedial powers.47  In the next few years, the Law 
Review published two articles on school desegregation remedies.  Leonard 
Strickman argued for a definition of the violation in school desegregation 
cases that permitted certain kinds of interdistrict remedies, notwithstanding 
the constraints the Court had imposed on this kind of relief in the Milliken 
case.48  Stephen Kanner sought to explain and rationalize the Court’s “con-
trolling principle” concerning the relationship between the violation and the 
remedy in school desegregation and other equal protection cases.49  
                                                                                                                           
Moreover, major casebooks on the law of race did not generally appear until the 1970s.  The first 
edition of Derrick Bell’s Race, Racism, and American Law in 1973 quickly became the standard text in 
civil rights courses and was used by Professor Rubinowitz for several years after he succeeded Profes-
sors Netsch and Thomas Todd in teaching the course in 1975. 
45  The Law Review did not join the scholarly debates that took place in the aftermath of Brown 
about the correctness and the persuasiveness of the decision.  See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The 
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination 
and Judicial Integrity:  A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).  However, in a 
1979 Law Review article, Raoul Berger reiterated his argument that the legislative history of the Four-
teenth Amendment demonstrated that the framers did not intend to prohibit school segregation.  Raoul 
Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment:  Light from the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 311, 326–31 (1979).  
The debate about the opinion itself continued with the publication in 2001 of a book in which a number 
of leading scholars wrote hypothetical opinions in the case.  WHAT “BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION” 
SHOULD HAVE SAID:  THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL 
RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
46  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
47  See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
48  Leonard P. Strickman, School Desegregation at the Crossroads, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 725 (1975). 
49  Stephen Barrett Kanner, From Denver to Dayton:  The Development of a Theory of Equal Protec-
tion Remedies, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 382 (1977). 
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Whatever school desegregation remedies courts adopted, implementa-
tion constituted a major challenge.50  Several articles in the Law Review ad-
dressed this issue—two focusing on the very early stages of implementation 
and a third addressing questions related to the termination of decrees dec-
ades after Brown.  In 1957, Dean A.E. Papale of Loyola Law School of 
New Orleans took note of the opposition that had already arisen to desegre-
gation and made a plea to southern political leaders to be realistic about the 
future and proceed with peaceful integration pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s mandate.51  Decades later, Davison M. Douglas analyzed the early 
desegregation experience in North Carolina, a state that had not pursued a 
strategy of complete resistance to the Supreme Court’s decision.  Douglas 
argued that the moderate rhetoric employed by North Carolina officials en-
abled the state to minimize both actual integration and the economic costs 
incurred by states that acted in open defiance of the Court’s mandate.52 
In a 2000 article, Wendy Parker examined the extent to which school 
desegregation cases were ending, which might have sounded the death knell 
for this litigation.53  She found that in spite of several Supreme Court deci-
sions in the 1990s that discussed the prerequisites for terminating desegre-
gation litigation, there was little movement by defendants to end their 
cases.54  Parker concluded that court-ordered desegregation was alive, but 
not well, since many cases were languishing and in need of more active ju-
dicial involvement to achieve their original purposes. 
With remedies adopted and implementation stagnating in the South in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, civil rights lawyers and the courts also turned 
their attention to school segregation in the North.  Brown applied directly 
only to states where state statutes or constitutional provisions required or 
permitted public school segregation.55  No such formal rules governed 
school attendance in the North, yet many school systems experienced a high 
degree of racial segregation at mid-century.   
It was not until its 1973 decision in Keyes that the Supreme Court 
found that de jure segregation could exist as a result of school board poli-
cies and practices.56  However, a decade earlier, the Law Review published a 
 
50  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
72–93 (1991). 
51  Papale, supra note 25, at 318.  The article was based on a Rosenthal lecture that Dean Papale pre-
sented at the Law School in the 1956–57 academic year.  This is an annual lecture series at Northwest-
ern, funded by the Julius Rosenthal Foundation.   Publication of the lectures has contributed to legal 
scholarship for more than seventy years. 
52  Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation:  Desegregating the South During the Decade 
After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92 (1994). 
53  Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000). 
54  Id. at 1162–78 (discussing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 
467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991)).  
55  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954). 
56  Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).  
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series of three articles by John Kaplan examining school desegregation liti-
gation in the North.57  Two of the articles focused on specific cases—from 
Gary, Indiana and New Rochelle, New York, an integrated community out-
side New York City.  The third article focused on the northern problem 
more generally.  In these articles, Kaplan probed the facts of northern 
school segregation and suggested the kind of complicated legal analysis that 
was necessary to make constitutional determinations in these cases.58   
Along with pursuing desegregation, activists interested in educational 
opportunity turned to litigation seeking to achieve “equalization” across 
school districts.  Although these cases focused most directly on wealth ine-
quality, they had important racial implications.  After the Supreme Court 
found no constitutional violation in the existence of vast disparities in re-
sources among a state’s school districts in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez59 in 1973, proponents of school finance equalization 
turned to state courts and legislatures to achieve their goals.  In a 1976 arti-
cle in the Law Review, Edward A. Zelinsky argued that proponents’ state 
school aid formulas for reducing disparities would be counterproductive be-
cause they favored middle-class suburbs over central cities.60  He urged re-
vising the formulas to emphasize poverty, in order to ensure that funds 
would be distributed to more urbanized communities. 
Twenty-five years later, Denise Morgan took a different tack on the 
school finance litigation.  She argued that disparities in school funding con-
stituted a form of systemic racial discrimination because disparities in re-
sources caused racial disparities in educational outcomes.61  Remedies under 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act therefore should include educational 
initiatives that research has shown to have a positive impact on student 
achievement, such as smaller class size and smaller schools.62 
The Law Review’s scholarship related to race and education was 
marked by a heavy emphasis on both quantitative and qualitative empirical 
research.  Zelinsky’s article on educational equalization applied a variety of 
state aid formulas to Connecticut school districts in order to reach the con-
clusion that the school districts with the largest population of poor and mi-
 
57  John Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools—Part I:  The New Rochelle Experience, 58 
NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1963); John Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools—Part II:  The General 
Northern Problem, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 157 (1963);  John Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the 
Schools—Part III:  The Gary Litigation, 59 NW. U. L. REV. 121 (1964).  Kaplan taught at Northwestern 
when he began these articles and moved on to a long career at Stanford Law School during that period. 
58  Since much of the discussion of the limits on courts’ remedial powers came in northern cases, 
Kanner discussed the northern cases that followed Keyes.  Kanner, supra note 49. 
59  411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
60  Edward A. Zelinsky, Educational Equalization and Suburban Sprawl:  Subsidizing the Suburbs 
Through School Finance Reform, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 161 (1976). 
61  Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation:  Acknowledging that Race Discrimina-
tion in Public Education Is More than Just a Tort, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 99 (2001). 
62  Id. at 188. 
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nority people—Bridgeport, Hartford, and New Haven—would be “losers” 
under each of those formulas.63  Parker carried out a very substantial quanti-
tative analysis of school desegregation cases to determine the status of those 
cases and the extent to which efforts had been made to terminate them or to 
move them toward the relief to which plaintiffs were entitled.64 
On the qualitative side, Kaplan undertook significant research on the 
communities and the school districts in Gary and New Rochelle as part of 
his exploration of the desegregation litigation in those communities.65  Simi-
larly, Douglas examined the desegregation experience of North Carolina in 
depth to analyze the impact of the use of moderate rhetoric in response to 
Brown.66 
Finally, several of the education articles challenged the conventional 
wisdom of the time.  While most research on “massive resistance” made no 
distinctions among southern states’ strategies, Douglas argued that there 
were significant differences among the states in their responses, and that 
those differences had important outcomes for the states involved.67  Ze-
linsky’s analysis of the impact of state aid formulas directly confronted the 
widely shared view among equalization proponents that their formulas 
would accomplish their purpose.68  Moreover, Parker’s analysis of the status 
of desegregation cases put the lie to the consensus that the Supreme Court’s 
termination decisions made desegregation remedies a thing of the past. 
2. Race Consciousness.—The Supreme Court first addressed the le-
gality of state-sponsored affirmative action in the Bakke case in 1978, up-
holding a challenge to the University of California at Davis Medical 
School’s use of racial/ethnic quotas in its admissions process.69  More than a 
decade earlier, well before the term “affirmative action” came into vogue, 
the Northwestern University Law Review published an article by Kaplan 
that anticipated much of the debate that has garnered so much attention 
since that time.70  His 1966 article, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:  
Equality for the Negro—The Problem of Special Treatment, was one of the 
first in-depth examinations of this complex and controversial subject.71  
Kaplan discussed many of the theoretical and practical arguments in sup-
 
63  Zelinsky, supra note 60. 
64  Parker, supra note 53. 
65  See supra note 57. 
66  Douglas, supra note 52. 
67  For example, North Carolina’s reputation as a “moderate” state on race helped it attract industry 
and develop economically.  Id. at 96. 
68  Zelinsky, supra note 60, at 203. 
69  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
70  John Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:  Equality for the Negro—the Problem of Spe-
cial Treatment, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 363 (1966). 
71  Id. 
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port of, and in opposition to, the use of racial preferences in three important 
areas of social life—employment, housing, and education.   
The debate about race consciousness surfaced periodically in the Law 
Review.  In a 2004 symposium on the Rehnquist Court, Nelson Lund72 
strongly criticized the Court’s continued approval of race-conscious admis-
sions in higher education in the 2003 Grutter decision.73  Lund suggested 
that the precedent to which Grutter bore “the greatest formal resemblance” 
was Plessy, because both decisions deferred to what the Justices deemed to 
be “reasonable” measures to achieve goals that proponents viewed as im-
portant to society.74  
In contrast, Christopher Bracey’s review essay of economist Glen 
Loury’s book, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, took as its starting point 
that color blindness did not characterize the American past or present.75  
Bracey ended by supporting Loury’s call for race-conscious measures to 
address the pervasive racial disparities resulting in part from deeply embed-
ded racial stereotyping.76   
3. Housing.—While housing discrimination is closely related to the 
problem of educational inequality, housing received far less attention in the 
Law Review in its second half-century.  During that time, the Law Review’s 
entire body of work on housing consisted of an article by Professor Leonard 
Rubinowitz, one of the authors of this piece, and Elizabeth Trosman, and 
three substantial student comments.77  Each of these papers owes a debt to 
Kaplan’s early article on race consciousness, since they propose race-
conscious measures to achieve goals of expanding “choice” for Blacks in 
seeking housing or achieving residential racial integration.  Each argues for 
race consciousness as a way of remedying the effects of racially discrimina-
 
72  Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court’s Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
249, 279–87 (2004). 
73  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
74  Lund, supra note 72, at 283–85. 
75  In a 1998 article, Stephen Siegel argued that an originalist analysis shows that the Constitution 
did not bar the federal government from enacting affirmative action statutes, such as the one the Su-
preme Court had struck down in the Adarand case.  Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s 
Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws:  An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (1998); see also 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
76  Christopher A. Bracey, Thinking Race, Making Nation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 911 (2003).  As 
Bracey pointed out, Loury had been a longtime outspoken opponent of race consciousness and a theore-
tician of color blindness.  This book represented a major change in Loury’s thinking about race in Amer-
ica. 
77  Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream:  Im-
plementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 491 (1979); 
David Blair-Loy, Comment, A Time to Pull Down, and a Time to Build Up:  The Constitutionality of 
Rebuilding Illegally Segregated Public Housing, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (1994); Richard H. Sander, 
Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 NW. U. L. 
REV. 874 (1988); Joseph Seliga, Comment, Gautreaux a Generation Later:  Remedying the Second 
Ghetto or Creating the Third?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
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tory policies and practices—public, private, or both—that have long charac-
terized metropolitan housing markets.   
The Rubinowitz and Trosman article analyzed the provision in the 
1968 federal Fair Housing Act that requires the United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development to administer its programs affirma-
tively to further fair housing.78  The authors argued that this mandate re-
quires race-conscious efforts to provide home ownership opportunities for 
Black home seekers on a broader geographical basis than had been avail-
able in the past.79  Richard Sander’s comment emphasized racial integration 
rather than expanded options for Blacks as the goal of housing reform and 
proposed several race-conscious measures designed to produce stable inte-
gration.80  He suggested that, in addition to the conventional explanations 
focusing on racial discrimination and income disparities, there is a dynamic 
process that perpetuates segregation.  
The other two student comments examined remedial aspects at differ-
ent points in the life of Chicago’s forty-year-old landmark public housing 
desegregation case—the Gautreaux case.81  While this case has been the 
subject of voluminous literature, these comments examined aspects of the 
case that had not been fully explored previously.82  Each proposed race-
conscious remedies that seemed both principled and pragmatic to the re-
spective authors in light of the circumstances at the time they were writing.  
In 1994, David Blair-Loy argued that it would be unconstitutional to reha-
bilitate the existing segregated public housing without having in place other 
initiatives to provide public housing residents with opportunities to move 
into predominantly white areas.83  By 2000, much of Chicago’s public hous-
ing had been demolished, and much of his argument had become moot.  In 
revisiting the remedial possibilities at that point, Joseph Seliga argued that 
both redevelopment of public housing sites and mobility initiatives should 
be employed to produce racial integration and avoid creating another 
ghetto.84 
 
78  42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).  
79  Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 77, at 615.   
80  Sander, supra note 77, at 919–21. 
81  Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), order outlining the remedy, 
304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).   
82  See generally LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND 
COLOR LINES:  FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000).  The lead counsel for the plaintiffs 
has written a memoir of the case.  See ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX (forthcoming 
Jan. 2006)..  Stephen Barrett Kanner discusses Gautreaux through the Supreme Court’s examination of 
the remedial powers of the district court.  Kanner, supra note 49, at 395–403.  Richard H. Sander also 
discusses Gautreaux as he searches for models of the kind of mobility he proposes.  Sander, supra note 
77, at 907–13, 917–21. 
83  Blair-Loy, supra note 77. 
84  Seliga, supra note 77. 
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4. Economic Opportunity.—The Civil Rights Movement of mid-
century and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressed racial discrimination in 
employment in all kinds and levels of jobs.  Once again, the focus was 
largely on the South although employment discrimination was widespread 
throughout the country.  With time, a broader understanding of economic 
opportunity and wealth disparities broadened the agenda to include entre-
preneurial opportunities and access to other forms of wealth, including 
home ownership.   
A few articles in the Law Review addressed important but isolated as-
pects of economic inequality.  In 2001, Thomas Mitchell pushed the schol-
arly envelope by examining a problem facing southern Blacks that had 
received little attention in the law reviews—the dispossession of land from 
African-American families.  While the United States had never made good 
on its Reconstruction-era promise of “forty acres and a mule” for former 
slaves, many Blacks had managed to acquire farm land in the rural South in 
the late nineteenth century.  Mitchell demonstrated in great detail the com-
plex of legal and practical forces that had caused an involuntary loss of 
much of this land, focusing primarily on partition sales of Black-owned 
land held under tenancies in common.  He also proposed innovative legal 
reforms and practical steps that could reduce future losses of this important 
economic resource.85   
Other Law Review articles looked at more conventional aspects of 
Blacks’ economic opportunities, such as the courts’ reluctance to address 
the present effects of past employment discrimination in the early days of 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,86 the applicability of the National 
Labor Relations Act to racial discrimination by both unions and employ-
ers,87 and the application of Title VII to upper-level jobs.88  This scholarship 
confronted some of the important basic questions in what was then an 
emerging field of federal employment discrimination law.   
5. Public Accommodations and Transportation.—Civil rights activ-
ists—Montgomery citizens boycotting buses, sit-in demonstrators, and 
freedom riders—coupled with litigation and civil rights legislation dramati-
cally changed policies and practices of public accommodation and transpor-
 
85  Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:  Undermining Black Landowner-
ship, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 505 (2001).  Mitchell spoke of Blacks losing land involuntarily, which in some ways is 
analogous to the displacement of urban Blacks as a result of public housing demolition that began in the 
1990s.  Mitchell also argued that land ownership was positively related to community and democratic 
participation, so that addressing the land loss problem would have positive spillover effects. 
86  William B. Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial Discrimination in Employment, 64 NW. U. 
L. REV. 359 (1969). 
87  Richard J. Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act, 65 NW. U. L. 
REV. 232 (1970). 
88  Earl M. Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level Employment—A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 
NW. U. L. REV. 776 (1983). 
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tation, especially in the South.  This is a story of the efficacy of both activ-
ism and law reform and, sometimes, the synergy between the two.  In a con-
text in which so much of the effort to challenge racial subordination has 
produced mixed results at best, the campaign to end discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations and transportation stands out as a success.   
However, only one Law Review article addressed racial discrimination 
in public accommodations.  Rather than focusing on traditional “public ac-
commodations,” such as restaurants, hotels, theaters, or public transporta-
tion, this major, book-length article examined a novel arena untouched by 
most scholarship.  In 1995, Joseph Singer argued, in No Right to Exclude:  
Public Accommodations and Private Property, that the law should prohibit, 
in a clear way, racial discrimination by retail stores.89  Title II of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act regulated so-called public accommodations, like hotels and 
restaurants.  Moreover, the scope and the reach of the post-Civil War Civil 
Rights Acts remained uncertain.  Singer argued that the law should be clari-
fied to conform to social expectations that businesses will serve the public 
unless they have good reasons not to do so.  His persuasive argument was 
particularly important and timely in light of the continuing claims of Blacks 
that retail stores treat them as security risks by excluding them and by using 
unusually aggressive surveillance measures because of their race.   
6. Criminal Justice.—The questions related to race and the criminal 
justice system changed dramatically during the Law Review’s second half-
century.  In the era of Jim Crow, civil rights advocates challenged the racial 
bias that permeated the criminal justice system of the South, from not 
prosecuting whites who lynched Blacks or assassinated civil rights leaders 
and workers to exclusion of Blacks from juries, which led both to acquittal 
of whites in crimes against Blacks and conviction of innocent Blacks.   
As some progress was made in addressing these historical problems, 
new modes of racial injustice emerged that were national in scope.  The last 
third of the twentieth century witnessed the mass incarceration of Blacks 
and Latinos, the racially disproportionate implementation of the death pen-
alty, dramatic disparities in sentencing along racial lines, and widespread 
wrongful convictions in cases involving defendants of color, especially in 
capital cases.   
The Law Review paid some attention to the earlier set of problems, but 
did not address the modern issues related to race and the criminal justice 
system.  Its consideration of the criminal justice system was limited to two 
articles focusing on discrimination in the South in the 1960s and 1970s.  
One argued for limits on states’ ability to exclude volunteer out-of-state 
lawyers, especially where local lawyers were unwilling to represent Black 
 
89  Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude:  Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1995). 
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defendants.90  It demonstrated that Black defendants routinely went without 
representation in misdemeanor cases.  Most white lawyers refused to handle 
their cases, and Blacks were extremely underrepresented in the legal profes-
sion as a result of discrimination at all levels of the educational system.  
The author also showed persuasively how southern states had used their 
ability to exclude out-of-state lawyers to ensure the lack of legal representa-
tion.  Lawyers from the North were poised to go to the South in greater 
numbers if these bars could be removed, so the article’s proposal had im-
portant potential practical consequences. 
The other article entered the ongoing federalism debates by arguing for 
federal intervention in the southern courts to protect against discrimination 
by the police, prosecutors, and judges.  The author proposed providing in-
junctive remedies for patterns of discrimination, taking the position that 
some states’ systems were so tainted that federal judicial intervention was 
necessary to ferret out the systematic racism.91  Advocates for “states’ 
rights” would have found this kind of proposal anathema, since it suggested 
substantial federal intervention into the southern states’ court systems.   
In sum, starting in mid-century, civil rights activism, litigation, and 
legislation all provided a new level of visibility to critical questions of race, 
and the Law Review responded to the challenge of examining these crucial 
and controversial issues.92  At the same time, there is a degree of continuity 
in the scholarship across the two periods.  The many difficult questions in-
volving public education received by far the most attention in the Law Re-
view; but other important racial matters were discussed as well.  However, 
there continued to be significant gaps in the aspects of the system of racial 
subordination that received serious attention, such as participation in the po-
litical process, economic opportunity, and contemporary inequities in the 
criminal justice system.  Moreover, in the second half-century, as in the 
 
90  David S. Mann, Not for Lucre or Malice:  The Southern Negro’s Right to Out-of-State Counsel, 
64 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1969). 
91  Andrew B. Weissman, The Discriminatory Application of Penal Laws by State Judicial and 
Quasi-Judicial Officers:  Playing the Shell Game of Rights and Remedies, 69 NW. U. L. REV. 489 
(1974). 
92  The Law Review also published a number of articles on broader subjects with racial implications.  
Raoul Berger argued that the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to reach 
suffrage, in support of his critique of the Court’s reapportionment decisions.  Berger, supra note 45.  
William Marshall used a case of gender discrimination to examine the balance between discrimination 
and the right of association.  William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. 
U. L. REV. 68 (1986).  Robert Bennett used the Supreme Court’s decision requiring proof of racial moti-
vation in Washington v. Davis as a springboard for a theoretical inquiry into the role of motivation in 
equal protection jurisprudence, generally.  Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1009 (1985).  Similarly, Erwin Chemerinsky 
argued for a reconsideration of the “state action” doctrine and proposed that values such as equality 
should be protected against private actors as well.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. 
U. L. REV. 503 (1985).  William Marshall responded to Chemerinsky’s argument in Diluting Constitu-
tional Rights:  Rethinking “Rethinking State Action,” 80 NW. U. L. REV. 558 (1985).  Chemerinsky re-
sponded in More Is Not Less:  A Rejoinder to Professor Marshall, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 571 (1985).   
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first, other people of color, such as Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native 
Americans, remained virtually invisible in the pages of the Law Review. 
II. GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
Prior to the 1970s, anyone perusing law reviews would have thought 
that only men had legal issues worthy of discussion.  The introduction of 
gender and sexual orientation into law review literature began with the en-
try of women into law schools and the legal profession.  Law schools began 
to admit women in substantial numbers only after passage of the federal 
civil rights laws and under threat of litigation in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.93  There were, for example, a total of 46 women and 329 men at 
Northwestern University School of Law in 1970.94  The new group of stu-
dents brought with them concerns about issues that affected their lives, and 
legal discussions of those issues began to appear first in student notes and 
comments.  Women entered legal academia as teachers in some, albeit 
small, numbers about a decade later.95  Their presence resulted in a flower-
ing of theoretical writing about women’s issues.  These developments, as 
they are reflected in the pages of the Law Review, can be divided into the 
following historical periods:  (1) the 1970s, the era of formal equality think-
ing about sex equality; (2) the 1980s, when many schools of feminist theory 
developed; (3) the 1990s, when feminist legal theory had become well es-
tablished; and (4) the present. 
A. The 1970s:  The Era of Formal Equality 
The development of legal theory about women is one of the many chil-
dren of the so-called Second Wave of the women’s movement, sometimes 
dated from the publication of Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine Mystique 
in 1963.96  Women formed consciousness-raising groups and began to dis-
cuss the many issues that affected their lives:  rape, child sex abuse, sexual 
harassment, domestic violence, illegal abortions, and exclusion from educa-
tional and employment possibilities as well as from places of public ac-
commodation—all issues that had essentially been ignored by the law 
during the period when it was dominated by men.  After private discussions 
 
93  The number of women law students increased from 3.7% in 1963–64, to 8.6% in 1970–71, to 
34% in 1980–81.  ABA, OFFICIAL AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 
456 (Rick L. Morgan & Kurt Snyder eds., 1999).  
94  Compiled from Programs from the 112th, 113th, and 114th Commencements (on file with Regis-
trar, Northwestern University School of Law).  In 1957, by contrast, there were 288 men and two 
women.  Compiled from Programs from the 99th, 100th, and 101st Commencements (on file with Regis-
trar, Northwestern University School of Law). 
95  Although 41% of law students were women by 1986, only about 20% of full-time law faculty 
were.  Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education:  What It’s Like to Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave 
or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 801, 803 (1988). 
96  See MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN & MORRISON TORREY, FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE:  TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 20 (2d ed. 2001). 
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revealed how common these problems were in the lives of women, activist 
women sought law reform.  With the passage of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act in 1964, formal equality of women in the workplace became a 
possibility at last.   
By 1969, the first course on Law and Women was taught, at NYU 
School of Law.97  While the first generation of legal activists litigated cases, 
they also began to write, and they and their students created much of the 
theory which then informed legal practice.98  The activities of these women 
during the 1970s, the results of their litigation campaigns, and their teaching 
and theorizing were central to the development of sex equality in the United 
States.  As one historian has commented, “the 1970s can be seen as a con-
stitutional moment of enormous significance—a time of major change in 
understandings of equality in the U.S. . . . .  In those years women citizens 
framed their demands for social equality as legal demands . . . .”99 
The first article on gender issues appeared in the Law Review in the 
1970–1971 volume—a student note about an Illinois case denying a hus-
band’s claim for survivor benefits under the state workmen’s compensation 
statute.100  The Illinois Supreme Court had upheld the discriminatory legis-
lation because it gave preferential treatment to (rather than discriminating 
against) women, but the student author predicted that Title VII would soon 
be interpreted by the Supreme Court to find that such “protective” legisla-
tion was impermissible sex discrimination—which is exactly what hap-
pened.101  At this time, student-written articles were published without the 
author’s name, so it is impossible to tell whether this note was by a male or 
female student. 
We do know that the second article on gender was written by a female 
student, Elaine Bucklo, now a judge on the federal district court in Chi-
cago.102  This comment, written before the first Supreme Court case to de-
velop the constitutional standard on sex,103 advocates applying a strict 
scrutiny standard to sex classifications, pointing out that this would obviate 
the need for an Equal Rights Amendment by striking down sex discrimina-
tory laws under the Fourteenth Amendment instead.104  The only legally 
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significant differences between men and women, declared the author, are 
physical strength and the ability to bear children.105  This comment, in short, 
pointed to the manner in which the law did in fact develop in the litigation 
campaigns of the 1970s, although the strict scrutiny standard was never at-
tained. 
The debate over the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) dominated the 
articles about gender issues in the Law Review during the 1970s.  The cam-
paign to pass the ERA, which would have made sex a suspect class under 
the Constitution, spanned the decade, until the amendment expired for lack 
of ratification by a sufficient number of states in 1982.106  Given the dearth 
of women teaching in law schools at that time, it is not surprising that the 
two articles about the ERA in the Law Review were written by male profes-
sors.  The first, by Northwestern law professor Jordan Jay Hillman, ana-
lyzed the probable impact of the ERA on employment law, discussing areas 
such as maternity leave, the employment of married women, fringe benefits, 
protective legislation, and even sex-segregated bathrooms.107  His treatment 
of these issues was very sympathetic to equal rights for women, but Hill-
man concluded that the EEOC Guidelines passed under Title VII were al-
ready sufficient to satisfy the ERA.108  Again, this was the direction the law 
in fact took, as interpretation of Title VII by the courts largely obviated the 
need for an ERA. 
The second non-student-written article about gender was written by 
Emeritus Professor Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago Law 
School.  It addressed the effect the ERA would have on the law of marriage, 
including surnames, residence, interspousal disputes, and the management 
of marital property.109  Rheinstein pointed to German, French, and Scandi-
navian law as possible models for changing U.S. family law in the direction 
of sex equality; he also wrote sympathetically about the need to protect 
long-term housewives in the event of divorce, a theme that would become 
important in feminist legal writing of the following decade.110 
In 1972, Title IX, the Education Amendments, were added to the Civil 
Rights Act, guaranteeing equal opportunity to men and women in public (or 
publicly funded) educational institutions and ensuring that the number of 
women in law schools would continue to increase.  A 1978 student com-
ment discussed whether a private right of action should be implied under 
Title IX while the decisive case, Cannon v. University of Chicago, was 
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pending certiorari in the Supreme Court.111  The student concluded, contrary 
to the ultimate outcome of Cannon, that implication of a private right would 
be inconsistent with the statutory scheme of enforcement.112 
In the spring of 1973, a year after she graduated from Northwestern 
University School of Law, Elaine Bucklo taught the first course on Women 
and Law at her alma mater while working as a judicial clerk on the Seventh 
Circuit.113  There were seven students in the class, all women.114  In 1974, 
the course was taken over by Helen Hart Jones, an adjunct professor who 
was an employment lawyer in Chicago, and was taught on an annual basis 
to increasing numbers of students; in 1979, eight of the fifteen students in 
the course were men.115  The course on Law and Women at Northwestern 
was offered on a regular basis from 1973 until 1989, when it was replaced 
by the current course on Feminist Jurisprudence, first taught by Cynthia 
Bowman, one of the authors of this piece, who went on to co-author a case-
book for West Publishing on the topic.116 
The authors of the first generation of textbooks on women and law 
were instrumental in changing the law.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg directed the 
Women’s Rights Project at the New York office of the ACLU, which insti-
gated a litigation campaign modeled on the civil rights campaign of the 
1950s and 1960s, seeking to invalidate sex discriminatory laws under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This campaign re-
sulted in a series of major successes, striking down barriers to women’s en-
try into the professions and allowing them access to benefits in the public 
sphere, but ultimately failed to achieve strict scrutiny of classifications 
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based on gender.117  The litigation campaign also failed to establish preg-
nancy as sex discrimination under the Constitution, resulting in the famous, 
and oft-ridiculed, footnote 20 in Geduldig v. Aiello, distinguishing between 
“pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”118  Some commentators attrib-
ute the subsequent flowering of feminist thinking about the law to these 
failures.119  The 1970s had been dominated by liberal feminists and the goal 
of formal legal equality—for women to be treated in the public sphere just 
the same as men are.  Women’s continuing inequality in the private sphere 
(for example, their unequal responsibility for the care of children) and the 
undeniable differences between men and women with respect to pregnancy 
and childbirth demonstrated the limitations of formal equality thinking in 
the law, calling for fresh approaches. 
B. The 1980s:  The Flourishing of Feminist Theory in the Law 
The critique of the liberal feminist approach and of formal equality 
thinking called forth a number of “schools” of feminist legal theory.  The 
first, and still very influential, theory to emerge was that of Catharine 
MacKinnon, who published her seminal book, Sexual Harassment of Work-
ing Women, in 1979.  In her subsequent work MacKinnon developed her 
critique of formal equality theory as based upon a male norm and proposed 
an alternative, dominance theory, which focuses upon the structures of 
power that make men’s characteristics (e.g., nonpregnancy) the norm.120  
Another influential theory, often dated from the publication of Carol Gilli-
gan’s In a Different Voice in 1982, emphasized the need to take account of 
the differences between men and women and to value the “female” ap-
proach, which Gilligan described as based upon an ethic of care rather than 
of rights.  In feminist jurisprudence, this approach is often called relational 
feminist theory. 
The pages of the Law Review took some account of these develop-
ments in feminist legal theory during the 1980s, but for the most part did 
not publish theoretical pieces.  A 1980 student comment about the failure of 
the Equal Pay Act to address female job segregation into low-paid jobs may 
be seen as a critique of the formal equality approach.  Its author, Melinda P. 
Chandler, pointed to the systematic undervaluation of work done by 
women, criticizing early Title VII case law in this respect, and argued that 
the only solution to this problem was a theory of comparable worth, under 
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which equal pay would be required not for identical jobs but for those re-
quiring equivalent skills.121 
The only piece of original feminist legal theory published in the Law 
Review during this decade was Deborah Rhode’s influential article, Asso-
ciation and Assimilation, in 1986.122  A chapter in her larger book on gender 
discrimination, the article addressed sex-segregated institutions such as sin-
gle-sex clubs and schools, showing how they have both empowered and ex-
cluded women historically.  Rhode emphasized the need for a contextual 
analysis, distinguishing situations where sex differences translate into social 
disadvantage and recommending an approach under which institutions that 
perpetuate disadvantage on the basis of sex might be prohibited, while oth-
ers might be maintained.123  Thus, unlike the approach of formal equality 
thinkers, under Rhode’s approach, associations of disadvantaged or subor-
dinated groups might be treated differently from associations of those in 
power who are attempting to exclude those disadvantaged groups. 
Deborah Rhode’s article is the only foray the Law Review made into 
the world of feminist legal theory in the 1980s.  Major theoretical develop-
ments in legal thinking about women were taking place during this decade, 
but these developments were noted in the Law Review only in a series of 
book review essays.  A lengthy and reflective book review essay about 
MacKinnon’s second book, Feminism Unmodified, written by another 
prominent feminist legal scholar, Lucinda M. Finley, appeared in the Law 
Review in 1988.124  A book review essay by Marie Ashe about Mary Ann 
Glendon’s Abortion and Divorce in Western Law appeared in the same is-
sue.125  (Indeed, Glendon’s book first took shape as the 1986 Rosenthal lec-
tures at the Northwestern University School of Law.)  It was not until 1993 
that relational feminism found its way into these pages in an article criticiz-
ing its implications for the debate over abortion and arguing that “masculin-
ist” theories based on autonomy, not relation, were necessary to defend 
women’s rights in this respect.126 
The feminist issue that dominated the pages of the Law Review in the 
1980s was abortion, yielding a total of five major articles, three of them by 
men.  The first two, by Northwestern Professor Robert W. Bennett and by 
Yale Law Professor Thomas I. Emerson, were directly related to the au-
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thors’ active participation in the controversy over abortion.  Bennett’s 1981 
article drew upon his (losing) argument to the Supreme Court in favor of 
funding abortions under Medicaid.127  Professor Emerson’s article was de-
rived from his own testimony to Congress against the then-pending Human 
Life Amendment, which would have overturned Roe v. Wade by finding 
that human life began at conception.128  In addition, in a 1989 article about a 
Canadian abortion decision, Professor Glendon argued, as she had in Abor-
tion and Divorce in Western Law, against the American model of grounding 
abortion in a theory of individual rights and establishing it through courts 
rather than the legislature.129   
One of the articles about abortion in the Law Review did constitute a 
major contribution to feminist literature about reproduction, however, and 
reflected the explosion of theoretical writing on this issue in books, law re-
views, and amicus briefs during the 1980s.  Andrew Koppelman’s article, 
Forced Labor:  A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, joined the 
search for an alternative constitutional provision on which to ground the 
right to abortion, alternative to the privacy-based approach in Roe v. 
Wade.130  Privacy, of course, is a double-edged sword for women, shielding 
as it had a great deal of violence against women from public view and legal 
remedy.  Koppelman, who joined the Northwestern Law School faculty in 
1997, suggested grounding the right to abortion in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment instead, arguing that compelling a woman to carry and to bear a child 
constituted involuntary servitude.  Koppelman’s article is the Law Review’s 
only example of the creative thinking characteristic of feminist legal theory 
on reproductive issues during this decade. 
C. The 1990s:  Gender Theory Established in the Academy 
By the 1990s, gender theory was well established in law schools.  Al-
most every school had a course on women and law—or feminist jurispru-
dence, as many of the more theoretical courses were now styled.  The Law 
Review, as legal literature all over, was full of articles on feminist theory 
and on legal problems unique to women.  Ten major articles on these topics 
appeared during this decade, and women’s legal problems had become a fa-
vored topic for student notes and comments as well.  Not one but two sym-
posia on feminist topics were published in the Law Review.  The first 
annual Feminist Symposium was held in 1993; prominent feminist legal 
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theorists were invited to speak, and the proceedings appeared in the 1993 
issue in their entirety.131  Another symposium, on the topic of child sex 
abuse, was organized by Michelle Landis, then-Articles Editor at the Law 
Review and now a law professor at Stanford, and published as an entire is-
sue in 1998.132 
At least one major article on a feminist topic was published in every 
volume of the Law Review during the 1990s.  A number of generalizations 
can be made about these articles.  First, the vast majority—nine out of ten—
were written by women, reflecting their entry in more substantial numbers 
into the legal academy.  Does this make a difference to the topics and their 
treatment?  A review of the articles written by men over the period from 
1992 to 2004 seems to indicate that it does.  Their topics included:  a legis-
lative history of the Fourteenth Amendment concluding that sex was never 
intended to be covered by it, an article about disparate impact claims by 
white males, therapeutic fetal surgery (ultimately coming out against it but 
rather sympathetic to the rights of the fetus), and a critique of the reasonable 
woman standard.133  Even though the authors by and large reached conclu-
sions that are consistent with sex equality, these topics are very dissimilar 
from those chosen by the female authors. 
Apart from one theoretical (and not tremendously persuasive) article 
attempting to locate MacKinnon’s dominance theory within the liberal tra-
dition,134 the women law professors publishing in the Law Review in the 
1990s chose to focus their attention on practical issues that have engaged 
the reform efforts of feminist legal activists since the 1970s.  As mentioned 
above, one product of Second Wave feminism was a flurry of activity 
aimed at reforming the law in the areas of rape, child sex abuse, domestic 
violence, sexual harassment, equal educational opportunity, abortion, and 
other reproductive issues.  As the activists sought social change, their prac-
tice informed theory, which then informed practice.   
This practice-theory-practice spiral can be easily illustrated by the de-
velopment of the law concerning sexual harassment in the workplace.  
MacKinnon’s 1979 book on the subject was derived in part from the at-
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tempts of women litigators (herself included) to create a cause of action for 
the harms of sexual harassment; in it she analyzed those harms, discussed 
how and why they were not cognized by current law, and proposed a new 
way of conceptualizing sexual harassment as a violation of women’s civil 
rights.135  Her analysis became the basis for the EEOC guidelines that laid 
the foundation for modern sexual harassment law and were approved by the 
Supreme Court in the Meritor case in 1986.136  By 1991, when the Clarence 
Thomas confirmation hearings focused national attention upon the subject 
of sexual harassment, more than a decade of feminist writing had developed 
legal theory on the topic, which now reached the public as feminist law pro-
fessors commented on sexual harassment law on television.137  After the 
televised hearings, the number of complaints to the EEOC increased dra-
matically, and numerous open issues about the legal standard, employer li-
ability, and application of the law to same-sex harassment were litigated—
and in turn analyzed in the law review literature, continuing the spiral.138 
The women law professors writing in the Law Review during the last 
fifteen years have participated in a similar theory-practice spiral.  Susan 
Stefan contributed a major article analyzing and criticizing Rape Trauma 
Syndrome, an evidentiary concept coming out of first-generation rape re-
form and used in court to explain women’s counterintuitive reactions to 
rape.139  Stefan argued that this characterization of women’s reactions to 
violence pathologized them, making women reacting in a rational fashion to 
violence appear to be crazy and in need of “adjustment,” thereby silencing a 
more appropriate anger over a problem that was social and political, rather 
than individual.  At the same time, Stefan pointed out that silence over sex-
ual abuse can indeed make women crazy, as evidenced by the statistics 
about childhood sexual abuse among women in psychiatric institutions.140  
This article is a wonderful example of second-generation feminist legal 
thinking—it analyzes experience under the rape reform laws, points out 
their shortcomings, and recommends changes in both the legal and mental 
health systems as a result. 
Domestic violence, another focus of the women’s movement in the last 
decades, was the subject of three main articles and one student comment 
over the five-year period from 1996 to 2001.  Women authors discussed, in 
light of feminist legal theory, the problems posed by spousal immunity 
privileges in domestic violence prosecutions, the inadequacy of provisions 
of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) to remedy the legal prob-
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lems of abused immigrant women, domestic violence as a ground for asy-
lum, and the difficulty of implementing the interstate enforcement of orders 
of protection under VAWA’s full faith and credit provision.141  All of these 
are fine examples of engaged feminist legal scholarship.  They are at the 
same time good examples of scholarship in the line of traditional law re-
view articles, which analyze the operation of the law in a particular area, 
point to its shortcomings, and make recommendations for reform. 
Women authors have also continued a major theme of feminist legal 
theory and reform from the 1980s—one that is close to their personal ex-
perience:  discrimination against women in law schools.  In addition to pub-
lishing articles about bias against women in law school and in the law 
school curriculum, women law professors in the 1980s had turned their at-
tention to deconstructing the image of women in the casebooks from which 
all lawyers are instructed.142  A 1993 article in the Law Review by Ann 
Althouse is an excellent example of this scholarship.  Choosing evidence 
casebooks as her subject, Althouse’s extensive and detailed analysis shows 
how women appear in evidence law courses as disturbed or vindictive liars, 
and men as innocent victims, especially in discussions of rape shield stat-
utes.143   
Some of the most interesting recent work by feminist legal theorists is 
in the field of family law.  This is ironic in a sense, because articles on fam-
ily law were the only ones arguably about women’s issues published in the 
first half-century of the Law Review.  In the 1970s, the impact of the formal 
equality approach upon family law was, predictably, to erase ways in which 
women were treated differently from men—to make alimony gender-
neutral, for example, and to do away with the presumption of maternal cus-
tody of children.144  The 1980s and 90s saw extensive criticism of these re-
forms by feminist legal scholars, who pointed out how they had harmed 
women.145 
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In 1996 and 1998, the Law Review published two major contributions 
to this debate, both by the same author, Katharine B. Silbaugh.  In the first, 
Turning Labor into Love:  Housework and the Law, Silbaugh detailed the 
economic value of housework performed by women without compensation, 
and demonstrated its pervasive undervaluation by the law—in premarital 
contracts, social security law, the law of consortium, tax law, upon divorce, 
in the welfare system, and in labor law.  Denying the productive nature of 
housework, she argued, harms those who perform this work:  women.146   
Silbaugh’s second article built upon this analysis to reach the revision-
ist conclusion that marital contracts should not be enforced.147  This conclu-
sion was directly opposed to the increasing trend by courts to uphold 
contracts between married couples upon divorce, but only as to monetary 
terms.  In light of the fact that women’s nonmonetary contributions are 
more significant than those of men, Silbaugh argued that monetary and 
nonmonetary contributions should be treated alike, because the selective en-
forcement regime harmed women.  Rather than concluding that both should 
be enforced, however, she concluded that neither should be, because to en-
force many nonmonetary provisions would harm the welfare of children 
and lead to commodification of marital exchanges.148  These two articles are 
immensely important contributions to the current—and lively—debate 
about the nature of marriage.  Like so much of the other writing by feminist 
legal theorists during this decade, they deepen our understanding of the law, 
of equality, of the nature of the public and private spheres, and of the differ-
ential relationship of men and women to the law. 
D. Where Have We Been and Where Are We Now? 
Feminist articles appear to have become less frequent in the Law Re-
view during the first years of the new millennium.  An article by one femi-
nist legal scholar, Kimberly A. Yuracko, now a professor at the Law 
School, has continued the tradition of blending doctrinal scholarship with 
feminist theoretical analysis.  In One for You and One for Me:  Is Title IX’s 
Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Posi-
tions Defensible?, she examined Title IX’s requirement that schools provide 
varsity athletic opportunities to male and female students in proportion to 
their numbers in the undergraduate population.149  After surveying a number 
of value-neutral justifications for the proportionality requirement, Yuracko 
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(1981). 
146  Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love:  Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(1996). 
147  Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65 
(1998). 
148  Id. at 122–35. 
149  Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me:  Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality 
Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2003). 
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concluded that none of them can justify it.  Instead, she concluded, the pro-
portionality requirement is derived from a value-based commitment to cul-
tivate traits in women that are valued socially.150 
The majority of articles on feminist topics in the recent issues of the 
Law Review, however, have been written by student authors.  The connec-
tion between legal analysis and legal reform described above has been par-
ticularly appealing to women law students, who have written case notes and 
comments on feminist topics in large numbers.  Their topics are those that 
have provoked feminist legal activism—for example, liability standards in 
school sexual harassment cases under Title IX, single-sex education and 
constitutional equality law, domestic violence and asylum law, and abuse 
against mail-order brides as a form of sex trafficking or involuntary servi-
tude.151  Some of these authors had taken the course in Feminist Jurispru-
dence and studied from the casebooks developed by first-generation 
feminist legal scholars.   
The student pieces also demonstrate how the reevaluation and promo-
tion of student articles in the Law Review has contributed to the lively de-
bate taking place in its pages.  In the early years of the Review, student 
authors wrote (and probably were assigned to) case notes on recent Illinois 
Supreme Court cases; the work was predictably lifeless and dull, and it was 
not attributed to them by name.  Today, however, students pursue subjects 
that interest them personally; many of those topics have to do with gender 
and with issues that touch them in some way (the author of the piece on 
mail-order brides, for example, was Filipina).  Not only has the Law Review 
become much more interesting as a result, but legal research has been pro-
foundly enriched by this change. 
Legal writing about gender has not all been about heterosexual women.  
The 1980s and 1990s saw the growth of interest in legal topics affecting 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transsexual persons as well as theorizing about 
gender from a queer perspective.  The first courses on sexuality and gay 
rights were taught during the 1980s, and the first casebooks on the subject 
appeared in the 1990s.152  Except for a seminar taught once or twice by an 
adjunct professor, however, courses on sexuality and the law have not been 
available at Northwestern’s law school, although the topic is included to 
some extent in Feminist Jurisprudence. 
 
150  Id. at 788–800. 
151  Meghan E. Cherner-Ranft, Comment, The Empty Promise of Title IX:  Why Girls Need Courts to 
Reconsider Liability Standards and Preemption in School Sexual Harassment Cases, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1891 (2003); Pherabe Kolb, Comment, Reaching for the Silver Lining:  Constructing a Nonremedial yet 
“Exceedingly Persuasive” Rationale for Single-Sex Educational Programs in Public Schools, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 367 (2001); Schaffer, supra note 141; Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Comment, Abusive Mail-Order 
Bride Marriage and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2000). 
152  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW (1997); 
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1997); 
Kerber, supra note 97, at 442. 
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The Law Review, through the efforts of its student authors, published 
an article in this area even before literature on gay rights was at all com-
mon. A 1986 student case note dealt with the treatment of transsexuals un-
der Title VII, criticizing the Seventh Circuit for failing to find that a post-
operative male transsexual was legally a female for purposes of employ-
ment law.153  It was twelve years before another article in the area of gay 
rights law appeared, a 1998 case note about gay-bashing in a public 
school.154  The student lauded the Seventh Circuit for holding a school dis-
trict liable for discrimination against a gay student, finding that he had 
stated a claim for sex discrimination. 
By the year 2000, feminist jurisprudence was a field with many com-
peting theories—formal equality, dominance theory, relational feminism, 
critical race feminism, queer theory, and postmodern feminism.  The most 
recent comment published in this field by a Northwestern student author 
combines the last two of these theories, rather an unusual feat for a student.  
Megan Bell’s 2004 comment on Transsexuals and the Law is an interdisci-
plinary piece that uses Foucauldian analysis of the legal system and social 
control, along with postmodern feminist analysis by authors such as Judith 
Butler, to criticize the outcome in a case involving the validity of the mar-
riage of a transsexual for purposes of a Wrongful Death Act.155  The author 
goes on to discuss the variety of legal contexts in which gender definition 
may determine important rights, such as employment law, marital dissolu-
tion, and the like.  The article clearly demonstrates how much more interest-
ing legal doctrine and law reviews have become now that the academy has 
discovered, like historians of the West, that all these diverse people have 
been there all along.   
III. THE OVERLOOKED FRONTIER:  CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND 
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 
Although the Law Review’s articles on civil rights law, feminist juris-
prudence, and sexual orientation acknowledged the presence of diverse 
peoples and issues that concerned them, the Law Review virtually ignored 
legal theorizing based on the perspectives of people of color.  It is one thing 
to use traditional or even feminist approaches to analyze legal issues affect-
ing communities of color, but quite another to fundamentally integrate ra-
cial inequality and resistance into legal analysis.  As Berkeley law professor 
Angela Harris observed about legal scholarship two decades ago, “there 
was, seemingly, no language in which to embark on a race-based, system-
 
153  D. Douglas Cotton, Note, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines: Title VII and Transsexualism, 80 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1037 (1986). 
154  Alycia N. Broz, Note, Nabozny v. Podlesny: A Teenager’s Struggle to End Anti-Gay Violence in 
Public Schools, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 750 (1998). 
155  Megan Bell, Transsexuals and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1709 (2004). 
100:27  (2006) Race and Gender in the Law Review 
 57 
atic critique of legal reasoning and legal institutions themselves.”156  Since 
then, a movement created primarily by minority law professors has pro-
vided the missing language to challenge the legitimacy of law by exposing 
its complicity in the preservation of white supremacy and racial subordina-
tion.    
In the late 1970s, scholars of color began to contest the colorblind 
stance and victorious tone of the liberal approach that dominated civil rights 
discourse.  A decade later they had founded a branch of legal scholarship 
called critical race theory (“CRT”) that put racism at the center of United 
States law and policy and defined it as a systemic practice rather than a bad 
attitude.  Among critical race scholars were feminists who revised main-
stream feminist theorizing to reveal the inextricable connection between ra-
cism and patriarchy in the lives of women of color as well as in legal 
institutions that support hierarchies of power.  Today, CRT is an estab-
lished, though controversial, discipline:  several books collecting the 
movement’s key articles as well as a critical race casebook have been pub-
lished,157 critical race scholars have written hundreds of books and articles, 
and courses on these topics are taught at leading law schools across the 
country.  Their influence now extends beyond the law school walls to a va-
riety of disciplines in universities across the globe.158  The renowned Prince-
ton theologian Cornel West calls CRT “the most exciting development in 
contemporary legal studies.”159  
Yet the Law Review, as well as the Northwestern University School of 
Law’s curriculum, has paid little attention to this important theoretical per-
spective.  With the exception of one article, the few pieces addressing criti-
cal race theory and critical race feminism published in the Law Review have 
been book reviews.  To the Law Review’s credit, most of these publications 
were authored by one of the leading figures in the CRT movement, Richard 
Delgado, and deserve special attention.  A discussion of Delgado’s contri-
bution to the Law Review gives a glimpse of the exciting frontier of critical 
scholarship on race that the Law Review failed to explore.   
A. Critical Race Theory 
Two prominent articles by then-Harvard law professor Derrick Bell 
served as a bridge between traditional civil rights scholarship and critical 
 
156  Angela Harris, Foreword to RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  
AN INTRODUCTION xvii, xix (2001) [hereinafter CRT:  AN INTRODUCTION]. 
157  See, e.g., KIMBERLÉ W. CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995); CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d. ed. 2003); 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 2d. ed. 2000) [hereinafter CRT:  
THE CUTTING EDGE]; RACE AND RACES:  CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan F. 
Perea et al. eds., 2000). 
158  See, e.g., Special Issue on Critical Race Theory, 11 INT’L J. QUALITATIVE STUD. EDUC. 1 
(1998). 
159  Cornel West, Foreword to CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xi. 
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race theory.  Part of Bell’s 1976 Yale Law Journal article, Serving Two 
Masters:  Integration Ideals and Serving Client Interests in School Deseg-
regation Litigation, adopted the traditional mode of civil rights scholarship 
centered on the doctrinal analysis of race-related court decisions and con-
ventional interpretation of civil rights statutes.160  Bell examined the Su-
preme Court’s approach to the practice of soliciting clients in civil rights 
cases.161  But Bell went further to critique this traditional analysis by exam-
ining the dilemma of civil rights lawyers who attempted simultaneously to 
serve their ideological purposes and the conflicting educational interests of 
their clients which were no longer furthered by integration ideals.162  Bell’s 
audacious challenge to the dominant integration strategy, focused on the ac-
tual interests of Black people, set the stage for CRT, both conceptually and 
chronologically. 
Four years later, Bell published another pivotal article, Brown v. Board 
of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma,163 which introduced a 
second, more devastating blow to the liberal understanding of civil rights 
progress.  Bell’s concept of “interest convergence” asserted that whites 
were willing to support gains for Blacks when and only when these gains 
also benefited whites.  In other words, racial progress occurred strictly in 
line with whites’ self-interest.  Bell illustrated his point with the most her-
alded of civil rights victories, the Brown decision.  He claimed that the Su-
preme Court issued its guarded desegregation mandate only because it gave 
whites an advantage in the Cold War battle with communists for the Third 
World’s allegiance.164  Moreover, Bell argued that whites had historically 
sacrificed Black people’s interests to maintain white supremacy and would 
continue to do so.  These realizations led Bell to become a “racial realist,” 
 
160  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Serving Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).   
161  Id. at 495–97. 
162  Id. at 504.    
163  Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).  Professor Bell’s Yale Law Journal and Harvard Law Review articles are 
often credited as formative works of critical race theory, even before the existence of a formal scholarly 
movement.  See, e.g., CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xx.  Other intellectual precursors to CRT 
include Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law:  A 
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978), and Richard Delgado, The 
Imperial Scholar:  Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984).  
Derrick Bell also authored the first law school casebook on race.  See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, 
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (1st ed. 1973). 
164  Bell’s thesis has been confirmed by Mary Dudziak’s extensive archival research on the ties be-
tween federal support for desegregation and U.S. Cold War interests.  See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD 
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); Mary L. Dudziak, De-
segregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988). 
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recognizing that racial progress in America would always be slow, spo-
radic, and incomplete.165  
Bell’s pathbreaking articles ushered an outpouring of writing by schol-
ars of color that confronted the failure of conservative, liberal, feminist, and 
critical legal studies approaches to address the law’s central role in racial 
subordination.  In the summer of 1989, thirty-five legal scholars gathered at 
a convent outside Madison, Wisconsin, to participate in the first workshop 
on critical race theory.166  They shared their ideas for addressing the inade-
quacy of prevailing legal theory to grasp the more subtle and systemic 
forms of racism that persisted despite the gains of the civil rights move-
ment.167  Building on critical legal studies, radical feminism, nationalism, 
and other critical theories, these scholars incorporated their own experi-
ences and understandings of racism into the legal canon. 
Rather than treating racism as an aberration that contradicts American 
ideals, CRT holds that racism is systematically embedded in United States 
institutions and culture and is commonly experienced by people of color.168  
As Derrick Bell so powerfully argued, whites have a huge material and psy-
chological stake in discounting racism in order to hold on to the privileges 
they reap from it.169  CRT therefore rejects colorblind solutions to racial 
inequality, recognizing that only aggressive, race-conscious remedies can 
reverse the centuries-old institutionalization of white privilege and non-
white disadvantage.170   
 
165  Bell elaborated the concepts of interest convergence and racial realism in a number of articles 
and books.  See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992); DERRICK A. 
BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987). 
166  See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xxvii; Harris, supra note 156, at xix.  Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas provide the historical background and intel-
lectual genealogy of the first CRT workshop.  See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xix–xxvii.  For 
a helpful primer on CRT, discussing its history, basic tenets, and distinctive themes, see DELGADO & 
STEFANCIC, CRT:  AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 156. 
167  See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xiv–xvi (discussing CRT’s “deep dissatisfaction with 
traditional civil rights discourse”); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies:  The Reconstruc-
tive Theory of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) (criticizing critical legal stud-
ies for its “myopic preoccupation with the limited role of theoretical deconstruction” and discussing 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s theology as model of reconstructive vision); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform, and Retrenchment:  Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1331 (1988) (critiquing both neoconservative and critical legal studies approaches to civil rights 
and advocating a “distinctly progressive outlook that focuses on the needs of the African American 
community” and “is informed by the actual conditions of black people”).  
168  See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT:  AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 156, at 7; Crenshaw, supra 
note 167.  
169  See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
170  See CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xxix–xxx; see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF 
THE MAJORITY:  FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); Neil Gotanda, A 
Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, The 
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
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Critical race scholars have also contested the very notion of race.  They 
contend that races are not natural, biological classes of people, but so-
cially—and legally—constructed divisions that have been used to legitimate 
domination by one so-called race over others.  In his book White by Law:  
The Legal Construction of Race, for example, Berkeley professor Ian F. 
Haney Lopez demonstrates how legal definitions of whiteness changed over 
time in support of prevailing power arrangements.171  The dominant society 
has deployed stereotypes and policies to racialize minority groups at differ-
ent points in history in response to labor market needs and political devel-
opments.172  Although most of the early CRT writings concerned African 
Americans, some CRT scholars have critiqued the “black-white binary” for 
its simplistic focus on discrimination against African Americans,173 and 
CRT has grown to encompass studies of diverse groups.174  LatCrit theory, 
for example, emerged as a branch of CRT to investigate issues of particular 
concern to Latinos, such as immigration, language rights, bilingual school-
ing, and identities based on multiple statuses and heritages.175   
Critical race scholarship departs from conventional legal analysis in 
methodology as well as theory.  Its authors reject the dominant method of 
applying supposedly neutral legal principles to arrive at answers, preferring 
to seek out the perspectives and experiences of the most disadvantaged vic-
tims of racism.176  In keeping with their attention to voices from “the bot-
tom,” critical race theorists incorporated multidisciplinary research, such as 
historical and sociological studies, before it became trendy and frequently 
 
171  IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); see also 
DAVID ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS:  HOW AMERICA’S NEW IMMIGRANTS BECAME 
WHITE (2005); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995). 
172  See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT:  AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 156, at 8. 
173  See id. at 67–74; Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
1213 (1997).  But see Mari Matsuda, Beyond, and Not Beyond Black and White:  Deconstruction Has a 
Politics, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 393 (Francisco Valdez et 
al. eds., 2002) (cautioning that deconstructing the black-white paradigm may hinder the struggle for ra-
cial justice). 
174  Key CRT writings about Latinos, Asian Americans and Native Americans include:  ROBERT S. 
CHANG, DISORIENTED:  ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW AND THE NATION STATE (1999); IMMIGRANTS OUT!:  
THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN AMERICA (Juan Perea ed., 1997); IAN F. 
HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL:  THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, 
THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:  THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); ERIC 
K. YAMAMOTO, RETHINKING ALLIANCES:  AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERRACIAL JUSTICE 
(1999).  
175  See Symposium, LatCrit:  Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL L. REV. 1087 (1997).  Progressive 
white scholars have also contributed significantly to CRT, especially on the topic of white privilege and 
the failure of most whites to see it.  See, e.g., BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE:  WHITE 
RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998); STEPHANIE WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED:  
HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). 
176  An early and important defense of “looking to the bottom” as a methodology is Mari Matsuda, 
Looking to the Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 
(1987). 
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use narrative, or “legal storytelling,” to support their arguments.177  In addi-
tion, CRT is as much a movement as a mode of analysis in that many of its 
adherents are activists who are dedicated to ending the unjust racial order 
that they study.178  Critical race scholars share “an ethical commitment to 
human liberation.”179  Thus, they eschew the pretense of neutrality both in 
legal doctrine and in their intellectual pursuits.   
Many CRT professors have applied their critical praxis to the class-
room by examining the role of teachers of color in academia and exploring 
new pedagogies that train students to think more critically about law and 
racial power.180  As CRT scholarship flourished, courses on CRT became 
regularly available to students at about twenty law schools across the coun-
try, including the University of Michigan, Georgetown, and the University 
of Iowa.181  UCLA School of Law offers a concentration in Critical Race 
Studies, recognizing that “[t]o understand the deep interconnections be-
tween race and law, and particularly the ways in which race and law are 
mutually constitutive, is an extraordinary intellectual challenge with sub-
stantial practical implications.”182  While students at Northwestern have 
been introduced to CRT scholarship in courses on Race Relations Law, 
 
177  See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 156, at 37–49; Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppo-
sitionists and Others:  A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Symposium, Legal Storytel-
ling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).  A classic example of legal storytelling is Columbia law professor 
Patricia Williams’s interweaving of personal stories and legal analysis in her 1991 book, Alchemy of 
Race and Rights.  For a debate about critical race scholars’ use of narrative and storytelling, see DANIEL 
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:  THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN 
LAW (1997); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School:  A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. 
L. REV. 665 (1993). 
178  See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY:  REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 
(1994).  Among his many acts of activism, Derrick Bell resigned his tenured position at Harvard Law 
School in protest against the school’s failure to hire an African American woman to its tenure-track fac-
ulty.  He currently teaches at New York University.  (In 1998, Lani Guinier became the first and only 
woman of color among Harvard Law School’s tenured faculty.)    
179  CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at xiii (noting that CRT scholars share a common desire “not 
merely to understand the vexed bond between law and racial power but to change it”); see also 
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 156, at 3 (stating that CRT “sets out not only to ascertain how soci-
ety organizes itself along racial lines and hierarchies, but to transform it for the better”).   
180  See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Foreword:  Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Le-
gal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. (1989); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal 
Scholarship and Teaching:  Finding Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Word and the River:  Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 
(1992); Margaret Montoya, Silence and Silencing:  Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal 
Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263 (2000). 
181  See Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies:  An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1216 
(2002). 
182  See UCLA School of Law Concentration in Critical Race Studies, http://www.law.ucla.edu/ 
home/index.asp?page=1084 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005). 
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Law and Social Change, and a Constitutional Law Colloquium, the law 
school’s curriculum has never included a course devoted to CRT.183    
The Law Review also largely overlooked CRT scholarship.  Its pages 
contain only one article written from a CRT perspective.  Richard 
Delgado’s Campus Antiracism Rules:  Constitutional Narratives in Colli-
sion, an important contribution to the debate about the constitutionality of 
hate speech regulation, was published in 1991.184  In 1998 and 2005, the 
Law Review also published book reviews by Delgado.185  In addition, a 1998 
essay by University of Chicago Law Professor Tracey Meares reviewed 
Killing the Black Body:  Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty, 
by Dorothy Roberts, a critical race scholar and one of this piece’s authors.186  
Finally, Christopher Bracey’s review of The Anatomy of Racial Inequality 
by Glenn Loury embraced CRT’s rejection of colorblindness and admoni-
tion that race-conscious remedies are needed to dismantle systemic racial 
disadvantage.187   
The conspicuous inclusion of Richard Delgado’s work in the Law Re-
view bears special consideration.  A professor and Derrick Bell fellow at 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Delgado is a giant in the CRT 
movement and one of the nation’s most prolific legal scholars.  His 1984 ar-
ticle, The Imperial Scholar:  Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Litera-
ture, provided a crucial intellectual underpinning of CRT.188  The article 
proceeds from Delgado’s discovery at the outset of his teaching career that 
all of the twenty leading law review articles on civil rights were written by 
white males.189  Delgado identified a scholarly tradition consisting of “white 
scholars’ systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars 
 
183  As a visiting associate professor, Christopher Bracey, now a professor at Washington University 
in St. Louis, taught a race relations course that included discussions of CRT, as well as other theoretical 
approaches, but focused primarily on legal history.  E-mail from Christopher Bracey, Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Washington University School of Law, to Dorothy Roberts, Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University (July 11, 2005, 14:57:42 CST) (on file with authors).   
184  See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:  Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. 
U. L. REV. 343 (1991).  
185  See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo and Revisionism:  Relearning Lessons of History, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 805 (2005) (reviewing IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL:  THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR 
JUSTICE (2003)) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo and Revisionism]; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Road-
map:  Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215 
(1998) (reviewing STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE:  
ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997), and CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN:  A 
PERSONAL INTERPRETATION (1997)) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap]. 
186  See Tracey L. Meares, The Increasing Significance of Genes:  Reproducing Race, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1046 (1998) (reviewing DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY:  RACE, REPRODUCTION, 
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997)). 
187  See Bracey, supra note 76.   
188  See Delgado, supra note 163. 
189  Id. at 561.  Delgado updated his research a decade later in Richard Delgado, The Imperial 
Scholar Revisited:  How to Marginalize Outside Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 
(1992). 
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from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship.”190  And he concluded that 
this exclusion mattered:  white scholars promoted a view of racism as iso-
lated, aberrational, and outmoded acts that could be remedied without dis-
turbing whites’ privileged position.191  The Imperial Scholar issued a 
powerful condemnation of mainstream civil rights scholarship that high-
lighted the need for minority perspectives to gain greater prominence in law 
reviews.  Ironically, Delgado stands out as an exception to the Law Re-
view’s failure to heed his admonition that student editors should pay more 
attention to minority scholarship on racial issues.   
Delgado went on to author or co-author more than one hundred books, 
law review articles, book reviews, and essays that have contributed signifi-
cantly to every key theme of CRT.192  His 1991 Northwestern University 
Law Review article Campus Antiracism Rules:  Constitutional Narratives in 
Collision was an early example of CRT intervention in the battle over the 
constitutionality of state and university regulations of hate speech.193  In re-
sponse to arguments that racial epithets and insults are protected by the 
First Amendment, CRT writers described the concrete harms caused by as-
saultive speech and developed original theoretical defenses for protecting 
its victims.194   
In Campus Antiracism Rules, Delgado cast the constitutionality of 
campus codes that punish racist speech as a choice between protecting 
equality or protecting speech.195  Delgado pointed out that both approaches 
were plausible and could not be balanced against each other; rather, prevail-
ing constitutional analyses of hate speech regulation produced an indeter-
minate answer because they provided no way to prefer one paradigm over 
the other.  After discussing the competing speech and equality paradigms 
and reviewing other nations’ failure to resolve the dilemma, Delgado of-
fered a novel solution based on a “post-modern insight.”196  Delgado argued 
that racist speech is distinctively harmful because it “constructs” a shared, 
stigmatized image of minorities that helps to perpetuate racial subordination 
by strengthening racist ideology and disempowering minority groups.197   
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In a 1992 Yale Law Journal article, Rodrigo’s Chronicle, Delgado in-
troduced Rodrigo, the fictional son of an African-American serviceman and 
Italian mother, who returns to the United States from Italy, where he was 
educated, to pursue an LL.M. degree.198  The brilliant Rodrigo’s intense dis-
cussions with an unnamed professor of color about burning racial issues 
have become the ingredients for dozens of law review articles and a book 
nominated for a Pulitzer Prize.199  Delgado’s two book reviews published in 
the Law Review are part of this literature featuring Rodrigo and the profes-
sor.   
Rodrigo’s Roadmap:  Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Dis-
crimination a Blind Alley? critiqued the law-and-economics approach to 
civil rights law by examining two 1997 books that opposed affirmative ac-
tion and antidiscrimination laws, respectively—Stephan and Abigail Thern-
strom’s America in Black and White:  One Nation, Indivisible and Charles 
Murray’s What It Means to Be a Libertarian:  A Personal Interpretation.200  
The essay is set in a hotel restaurant where the professor retires during a 
break from an academic conference and encounters Rodrigo, now a law 
professor himself, and Rodrigo’s politically conservative colleague, Lazlo 
(“Laz”) Kowalski.  As the three professors spar over the free market’s ca-
pacity to cure racism, Delgado weaves together a compelling four-part ar-
gument for race-conscious remedies.201  Using cultural texts and social 
science data, Delgado shows that the human impulse to suppress others is 
ubiquitous; other species use similar strategies to exclude competitors; peo-
ple often irrationally refuse to help or trade with those of another race; and 
highly formal settings elicit the least racism.202  “Racism does present a 
unique challenge to free market philosophy,” Laz concedes.203 
In Rodrigo and Revisionism:  Relearning the Lessons of History, 
Delgado addresses a topic that has preoccupied much of his recent writ-
ing—Latino civil rights.  Delgado is one of the chief critics of the black-
white binary paradigm that focuses on discrimination against African 
Americans and that uses their struggle for civil rights as the model for other 
 
198  Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992). 
199  For a survey of Delgado’s main writings featuring Rodrigo and the professor, see Delgado, Rod-
rigo and Revisionism, supra note 185, at 806 n.2. 
200  See Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap, supra note 185.   
201  Delgado challenged free market approaches to racial discrimination in several of Rodrigo’s 
Chronicles.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Second Chronicle:  The Economics and Politics of 
Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Third Chronicle:  Care, Competition, 
and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REV. 387 (1993); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Tenth 
Chronicle:  Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711 (1995). 
202  See Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap, supra note 185, at 234–42. 
203  Id. at 242. 
100:27  (2006) Race and Gender in the Law Review 
 65 
ethnic groups.204  Delgado has helped to illuminate the particular history of 
anti-Latino oppression205 and to make a case for expanding civil rights dis-
course and struggle to include Latinos on their own terms.206   
Rodrigo and Revisionism reviews Racism on Trial:  The Chicano Fight 
for Justice, published in 2003 by another leading CRT scholar, Ian F. 
Haney Lopez.207  The essay opens with a nod to CRT’s social construction-
ist view of race as Rodrigo explains to the professor his newly discovered 
Latino identity.  Although Rodrigo previously emphasized his African 
roots, he has decided to acknowledge more his mother’s Latin origins and 
the Spanish-language heritage he acquired from his father, Lorenzo, who 
grew up in the Dominican Republic.208  Through the dialogue between Rod-
rigo and the professor, Delgado praises Racism on Trial for its contribution 
to the legal literature about the history of Chicano mistreatment and protest, 
but laments that Haney Lopez and the 1960s activists he describes missed 
an opportunity to further contest the black-white paradigm by distinguish-
ing between the Chicano and African-American liberation struggles.209  
Delgado suggests conquest and internal colonization of Chicanos in the 
Southwest, in contrast to slavery, as the defining historical event in Chicano 
history and the distinctive source of Chicano political disenfranchisement.210  
Conquest and the subsequent racialization of Latinos, Delgado argues, re-
quires particular remedies that need not be patterned after the Black civil 
rights model.211   
B. Critical Race Feminism 
One of the most revolutionary branches of both critical race theory and 
feminist theory is critical race feminism.  Critical race feminists have high-
lighted the failure of mainstream civil rights and feminist paradigms alike to 
see the intersection of racism and sexism in hierarchies of power and in the 
experiences of women of color.212  Like traditional legal doctrines, these ap-
 
204  See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle:  Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholar-
ship and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997); supra note 185 and sources cited 
therein. 
205  See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, THE LATINO/A CONDITION:  A CRITICAL 
READER (1998). 
206  Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights:  Assessing the Neoliberal Case 
for Radical Exclusion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 489 (2004) (reviewing GEORGE YANCY, WHO IS WHITE?:  
LATINOS, ASIANS, AND THE NEW BLACK/NONBLACK DIVIDE (2003)).  
207  See Delgado, Rodrigo and Revisionism, supra note 185. 
208  See id. at 807. 
209  See id. at 823. 
210  See id. at 824–26. 
211  See id. at 827–32. 
212  See infra notes 214–218.  Queer-crit theorists of color have similarly demonstrated the role of 
racism in maintaining sexual norms while criticizing homophobia within communities of color.  See, 
e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality:  Lesbians, Gays and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1994); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out yet Unseen:  A Racial Critique of Gay and 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 66 
proaches also “permitted women of color to fall through the cracks.”213  The 
racial critique of feminism’s focus on gender as the primary locus of op-
pression has inspired an ongoing reconstruction of a feminist jurisprudence 
that includes the historical, economic, and social diversity of women’s 
lives.  Critical race feminists have not only criticized feminist thought; they 
have transformed it.   
In an influential 1989 article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex, published in 1989 in University of Chicago Legal Forum, Colum-
bia and UCLA Professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw coined the term “in-
tersectionality” to denote the various ways in which race and gender 
interact to shape Black women’s experiences of subordination.214  
Crenshaw’s 1991 Stanford Law Review article, Mapping the Margins:  In-
tersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, ex-
panded this analysis in the context of domestic violence and rape.215  Both 
articles demonstrated how dominant civil rights discourse focused on male 
interests and feminism based on the experiences of white women erased 
Black women altogether and forced them to choose between identities. 
Angela Harris’s Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory con-
fronted the shortcomings of dominant feminist jurisprudence more di-
rectly.216  Harris demonstrated that white feminist scholars were guilty of 
“essentialism” by highlighting sexism as the most significant form of op-
pression in women’s lives and by implying that “there is a monolithic 
‘women’s experience’ that can be described independently of other facets of 
experience like race, class, and sexual orientation.”217  Feminist essentialism 
made white women the norm and led to the fragmentation of nonwhite 
women’s identities.  Like Crenshaw, Harris concluded that under the pre-
vailing feminist approach “black women will never be anything more than a 
crossroads between two kinds of domination, or at the bottom of a hierarchy 
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of oppression; we will always be required to choose pieces of ourselves to 
present as wholeness.”218 
Critical race feminists, including Asian, Latina, and Native American 
scholars, have dramatically altered feminist legal theorizing by placing at its 
center women’s multiplicity of identities and forms of oppression and resis-
tance.219  They have examined a broad range of legal concerns particular to 
women of color that previously remained invisible in existing legal ap-
proaches.220  Critical race feminists have also examined the particular histo-
ries of oppression various groups of women experienced, along with the 
disparaging, racialized images of minority women’s sexuality and mother-
hood that legitimize their subordination.221  And they have studied nonwhite 
women’s resistance against oppression, which has often differed from white 
women’s struggles, and advocated incorporating their visions of liberation 
in feminist and antiracist initiatives.222   
Finally, critical race feminists have highlighted the unique battles of 
minority women to gain entry and respect in the legal academy and profes-
sion.223  Veteran Northwestern University law professor Joyce Hughes, the 
first African American woman to gain tenure at a predominantly white law 
school, made important contributions to this literature.224  These battles were 
especially visible when the vilification of two Black law professors became 
the focus of national attention.  In 1991, when University of Oklahoma law 
professor Anita Hill, now at Brandeis, revealed that U.S. Supreme Court 
nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually harassed her, the ensuing media 
campaign to impugn her character revived stereotypes of Black female li-
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centiousness, deceit, and disloyalty to the Black community.225  As Univer-
sity of Iowa law professor Adrien Katherine Wing observes, “there was no 
national precedent for dealing with or understanding the worldview of a 
Black female law scholar and teacher.”226 Two years later, University of 
Pennsylvania law professor Lani Guinier, now at Harvard, was subjected to 
similar disparagement when President Bill Clinton nominated her to head 
the U.S. Justice Department Civil Rights Division.  Alluding to the deroga-
tory myth of the “Welfare Queen,” the conservative media labeled Guinier a 
“Quota Queen” while distorting her writings on affirmative action.227  
Professor Wing attributes her motivation to create the first collection of 
critical race feminist writings to these disturbing events involving Black 
female law professors.  In 1997, she published Critical Race Feminism:  A 
Reader, now in its second edition.228  Wing’s Global Critical Race Femi-
nism:  An International Reader expanded on the issues covered in the prior 
work to include international and comparative law, global feminism, and 
postcolonial theory.229  Another important anthology, dealing with Black 
men’s relationship to the feminist project, is Black Men on Race, Gender, 
and Sexuality:  A Critical Reader, edited by UCLA professor Devon Car-
bado.230  
The Law Review’s sole account of critical race feminism was the pub-
lication of a 1998 essay by Tracey Meares reviewing Killing the Black 
Body:  Race Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty by Dorothy Rob-
erts.231  Killing the Black Body recounts the history of regulation of Black 
women’s reproductive lives and exposes a resurgence of policies that de-
value Black motherhood, including the disproportionate prosecution of 
Black women for using drugs while pregnant, state-sponsored programs to 
encourage use of risky, long-term contraceptives by Black teenagers, and 
welfare reforms designed to deter women receiving public assistance from 
having children.  Noting that mainstream theories of reproductive rights ig-
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nored these violations, Roberts argued that “the meaning of reproductive 
liberty must take into account its relationship to racial oppression.”232   
Killing the Black Body belongs to the struggle by feminists of color to 
transform the meaning of reproductive freedom in America.  Women of 
color have long advocated a more complicated understanding of reproduc-
tive rights that extends beyond legalized abortion to encompass a broad 
right to reproductive control, including the right to bear children.233  They 
have placed reproductive rights in a social context that made government 
provision of family planning contingent on improvements in general health 
and living conditions.  An emerging literature on the history of the repro-
ductive rights movement not only includes the long-neglected activism by 
women of color but highlights its pivotal position in the movement.234   
Professor Meares commends Killing the Black Body for its critical 
analysis of the racial politics surrounding reproductive health policy that 
“excavates” easy assumptions and reveals new ways of understanding these 
policies.235  “It is impossible to read this book without thinking critically 
about what Roberts has said—and possibly changing your thinking as a re-
sult of the enterprise,” Meares writes.236  Meares faults the book, however, 
for failing to uncover the heterogeneity of Black public opinion and Black 
politics on these issues.237  She suggests that greater attention to class ineq-
uities is necessary to implement Roberts’s vision of reproductive liberty, in 
part because such attention will render the vision “more politically accept-
able.”238   
CONCLUSION 
In 1926, the Law Review’s main discussion of race relations law ap-
peared in a Northwestern law professor’s article that supported racial zon-
ing by private contract because “the fear of a negro invasion materially 
interferes with the profitable sale of almost every homesite.”239  For the 
most part, the Law Review’s first half-century of publication simply ignored 
women and people of color as well as the important questions of race and 
gender that were swirling in the world around it.  In the next fifty years, 
however, the Law Review took account of the flourishing of legal theorizing 
on race and gender that reflected the entry of minorities and women into the 
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legal academy and responded to activists’ efforts to use the law for social 
change.  The recognition of race and gender as important themes in the law 
has produced more complex, interesting, and useful legal theories that no 
doubt would shock the sensibilities of the white men who dominated the 
Law Review’s early pages.   
The Law Review’s discovery of race and gender was incomplete, how-
ever.  Acknowledging the presence of people of color is important, but it 
leaves too pretty a narrative of race and other forms of social injustice in the 
United States and the law’s central complicity in maintaining them.  Like 
the period when Lewis and Clark “discovered” the American West, the past 
one hundred years constituted “a barbaric century for the legal academy, 
which has, wittingly or not, [provided] the justificatory framework for 
shameful social practices that continue to this day.”240  In the last two dec-
ades, critical race theorists have produced a radical body of scholarship that 
highlights the failure of traditional civil rights and mainstream feminist ap-
proaches to see the law’s central role in “shameful social practices” involv-
ing race.  Their analyses of systemic racism and visions for achieving social 
justice vitally changed existing legal paradigms.  “Critical Race Theory is a 
gasp of emancipatory hope that law can serve liberation rather than domina-
tion,” writes Cornel West.241  The failure to fully explore this important 
frontier of legal thought significantly limited the Law Review’s discovery of 
the field of race and gender.   
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